MODULE: ARMED PROTECTION
By Koenraad van Brabant; Overseas Development Institute, Portland House, Stag Place, London SW1E 5DP, UK; +44-171-393-1674; fax: +44-171-393-1699; e-mail: k.brabant@odi.org.uk
GOAL: To provide an overview of the considerations and issues that can inform decisions regarding the policy and practice of armed protection.
OBJECTIVES: This module will enable the participants to articulate
•	the questions of principle that may pertain to the use of armed protection for humanitarian action;
•	under what conditions an agency might use armed protection;
•	for what purposes an agency might use armed protection;
•	a preference ranking about who provides the armed protection (in context);
•	their position on payment for armed protection;
•	key issues in the management of armed protection; and
•	the possible impact of armed protection on the image and perception of a humanitarian agency.

KEY LEARNING POINTS
a.	A policy on armed protection should clarify some questions of principle:
•	Is armed protection compatible with humanitarian action?
•	Is armed protection that improves the security of the aid agency, but not directly that of civilians, acceptable?
•	Should you work at all where armed protection is needed?
•	Should humanitarian aid agencies, in a given context, adopt a common practice or make their own decisions concerning armed protection?

b.	The decision to use armed protection will depend on a combination of considerations, essential ones of which are
•	what are the threats and risks that you try to respond to?
•	will armed protection be a reasonable safeguard to these threats and risks?
•	will intended target groups ultimately benefit from the use of armed protection?

c.	For what purpose(s) do you want to use armed protection: to protect the agency’s assets, to protect personnel and/or to secure a general area of operation? This decision will be influenced by a value judgment (what is worth protecting with guns?), a risk assessment (who or what is most at risk?) and concern over the image that it will portray.

d.	Armed protection can come from various sources: staff, hired militia, a commercial security company, the national police force, the national army, a rebel group, the UN civilian police or UN military troops. Each has advantages and disadvantages that may vary according to the context, and how an agency positions itself towards other actors in that context.

e.	The question whether to pay for armed protection raises ethical and economic arguments; none of which leads to a straightforward rejection of the possibility of payment.

f.	If used, armed protection needs to be well managed:
•	You need clear in-house procedures.
•	You need in-house expertise.
•	You will want to specify criteria and requirements about the qualities of the armed guards and their supervision.
•	You need to clarify who commands the armed guards.
•	You need to clarify the rules of engagement.
•	You need to clarify who provides the weaponry and other equipment.
•	You need to clarify if vehicles are available to armed guards and which ones.
•	Who is liable in case of injury or death resulting from your use of armed guards?
•	Are there clear criteria and procedures for terminating a contract with the providers of armed protection?

g.	The use of armed protection influences the agency’s image and the public perception of it. Armed protection can lead to the perception that the agency belongs to the social stratum of the wealthy or is becoming part of a conflict. Factors influencing image are the visibility of the armed protection, the behavior of the armed guards and the closeness of association of the agency with those providing armed protection.

ARMED PROTECTION
A. Definition
Armed protection refers to the deployment of firearms for the protection of civilians in general or of humanitarian agencies only.
Armed protection is a key aspect of a "deterrence" strategy.
B. Matters of principle and practice
The elaboration of a particular policy on armed protection requires the clarification of matters of principle and practice. This module raises questions, but does not prescribe answers.
1. Principle
•	Does an agency consider the use of armed protection as incompatible with the basic principles of what constitutes humanitarian action or only as a response (one that does not undermine its basic principles) to the conditions in which humanitarian action has to take place?
•	As a matter of principle, should armed protection be deployed to provide general security, including to the civilian population, or can it be deployed only to protect the action of humanitarian agencies?
•	Should a humanitarian agency work at all in an area where armed protection might be required?
•	Can it be acceptable to pay for armed protection, or should one, as a matter of principle, never pay for guns?
•	Can individual humanitarian agencies adopt their own policies on armed protection or should there be, as a matter of principle, a common policy that agencies adhere to? 

It should be noted that the decision of one or a few agencies to deploy armed protection may affect the agencies overall image and the public perception of all humanitarian actors in a particular situation. Moreover, it can increase the risks for the agencies that have decided not to use armed protection, as these now stand out as the "soft" targets.
•	How does the deployment of armed protection correlate to other principles such as the following:
-	Humanitarian workers should never carry weapons.
-	No weapons in the premises or vehicles of aid agencies.

•	Can the use of armed protection in certain field operations be reconciled with advocacy on the curtailing of the arms trade?

Does one pay for armed protection?
Several ethical and practical considerations can be taken into account in considering the decision whether to pay for armed protection. 
On the ethical level, is this a legitimate use of donations for charitable purposes? Does it not contribute, more or less directly, to a local arms race, a local war economy or an international trade in arms? Can an agency oppose the production and trade in e.g. small arms and still pay money for armed protection?
On the practical level, one can argue that a law and order service is still a necessary part of the function of our societies. In functioning democracies, part of one's tax contributions finance the police, "gendarmerie" and army. Directly hiring armed protection is essentially no different and makes only more transparent a practice that is otherwise less visible. Even in countries where there is a nominal police force, this may be so underequipped and underfunded that agencies have no choice but to provide the police with material and financial support if they want them to be effective.
From an economic point of view, one can argue that the cost of hired armed protection is relatively small compared to the cost of stores and assets looted. In this sense, the expense of armed protection replaces the expense of insurance coverage when the latter cannot be obtained.
Again on an ethical level, one can argue that the cost of a life lost, that of a guard or an assailant, in an armed confrontation, does not weigh up against the cost of stores and assets looted. In contrast, one can argue that the cost of a life of a guard or an assailant does not weigh up to the cost, in terms of suffering and possible death among the target groups, due to the loss of essential relief goods such as food and medicine. 
2. Practice
If there is no objection, in principle, to the use of armed protection, then there are further questions concerning the practice. A possible grouping of these questions come under the headings of context, management and image.
Questions of context.
•	Under what conditions would one use armed protection?
•	For what purposes would one use armed protection?

Questions of management.
•	Who provides the armed protection?
•	Does one pay for armed protection?
•	How is the armed protection managed?

Questions of image.
•	How does the use of armed protection influence a humanitarian agency’s image and the perceptions of it?

Discussing armed protection only becomes a practical issue if an agency has accepted that it may continue to work in an area where armed protection might be required, and that it is prepared to accept armed protection.
2.1. Context
A policy on armed protection may state that armed protection is acceptable only in exceptional circumstances, as a last resort and for a limited period of time. Different agencies may have this policy, but in practice apply different criteria in judging the context. Within an agency, the use of such a policy implies that the context is regularly reviewed to see whether the conditions that justified armed protection still apply.
Three key considerations arise here: conditions, purpose and scope.
Under what conditions would one use armed protection?
A rough distinction has been made between types of threat: intimidation and harassment, crime, banditry, street violence, terrorism and acts of war.
The question whether to deploy armed protection for a humanitarian agency depends on a combination of considerations, the essential ones of which are:
•	Are the threats and the risks such that they warrant the consideration of armed protection?
•	Would armed protection provide a reasonable deterrent to these threats and risks?
•	Who has the ultimate benefit of the agency's operating with armed protection? Are the threats and risks such that they warrant the consideration of armed protection?
•	What is the pattern of crime in the area: car theft, burglary, armed robbery, rape? Do most criminals use violence, are they armed, or not? Which group of people appears most at risk, locals, expatriates, women, those living in shantytowns, those living in wealthier areas? Is the agency at risk?
•	What is the pattern of banditry in the area: Are offices and warehouses being looted? Are convoys being attacked? Are people being kidnapped for ransom? Who appears most at risk? Is the agency at risk?
•	Are terrorist attacks being carried out? Grenade and bomb attacks, targeted assassinations? Is the agency at risk?
•	Is there "politically"-motivated violence i.e. is the agency being threatened or attacked because of its perceived role in a conflict?

Would armed protection provide a reasonable deterrent to these threats and risks? 
If this is not the case, armed protection is not the answer! The use of armed protection may have the opposite effect and actually increase the risks. If robbers expect a potential victim to be armed, they may turn violent more quickly. If bandits see a convoy as protected by an armed escort, they may immediately attack it rather than hold it up. If a warring faction sees humanitarian aid protected by armed guards, this may be perceived as a confirmation of the lack of neutrality of the humanitarian agency or assistance.
Who has the ultimate benefit of the agency's operating with armed protection? If the use of armed protection has no or little positive implications for the target groups of the agency's operations, then a suspension or cessation of activities may be a better response to the situation.
The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) policy states that the interests of victims and the persons to be assisted has to be taken into consideration first. Can human lives be saved only by accepting armed protection, i.e. do the target groups rely to such a degree on the provision of humanitarian assistance that a paralysis of that humanitarian assistance would put them seriously at risk? Secondly, could the security of the intended beneficiaries be endangered by the agency's use of armed protection?
For what purposes does the agency use armed protection?
Armed protection can be used
•	to secure the assets of the agency.
-	in its offices
-	in its residences
-	in its warehouses
-	in transit to a distribution point
•	to secure its personnel.
-	in the course of their humanitarian work
-	at their residences/off duty 
-	in the course of an evacuation
•	to secure an area e.g. a distribution site, against disturbances and threats.

The decision to use armed protection also needs to be clear with regards to its purposes. That decision may be informed by
•	the risk assessment: where do the highest risks appear to be, and what is most at risk, assets, people or both.
•	a value judgment: an agency may feel that only people should be protected and not assets, because assets would not merit the loss of human life if a shoot out occurred.
•	concerns about image and perception: the agency may decide to protect its assets and staff at their offices and residences, but not during convoying and distributions, as this is judged to compromise the image of humanitarian action.

Armed protection may be deployed in different ways to serve different purposes and convey different images. In north Iraq and, particularly, in Somalia, expatriate staff were assigned bodyguards, who would accompany them wherever they went. Alternatively, guards can be deployed to protect premises, residences and, by extension, the people within these premises.
Armed guards can be used to escort aid convoys, but can also patrol the roads or be positioned at checkpoints along the convoy route. In the latter case they provide more general security, and check and protect all those traveling the road, rather than just to the aid agency alone. In the early 90s, for example, local fighters in Kurdish Iraq were hired as armed guards and positioned on hilltops overseeing the roads to protect traffic against snipers.
What is the scope of extended armed protection?
The civilian population at large may be at risk of any of a variety of threats or worse, from massacres, crimes against humanity and genocide.
Most humanitarian agencies have traditionally not paid much attention to the question of the protection of civilians, including armed protection. Humanitarian agencies have generally interpreted their mandate to "save lives and reduce unnecessary suffering" in terms of what relief can offer: a safeguard against suffering and death from exposure, disease and starvation. To what degree the interpretation of the mandate includes protection of civilians and non-combatants from individual or organized violence, the ICRC, UNHCR and UNICEF aside, is up to individual agencies to decide. In recent years, the UN at large is reminded of its being grounded in a human rights charter, and the 1997 UN reforms open the door for a mainstreaming of human rights.
Those agencies who accept a wider interpretation of the mandate may wish to clarify under which conditions they would call for a multilateral deployment to provide armed protection to civilians under threat. Such calls have been made in the contexts of Somalia, Bosnia and eastern Zaire. The failures to protect civilians in the safe areas of Bosnia, during the genocide in Rwanda or the massacres in the forests of Zaire, have underlined the absence of international political will and highlighted the fact that the Security Council may be interested in international peace and stability, but not in protection.
The relationship between the protection of aid providers and endangered civilians raises fundamental moral and political questions. This module will further focus on the question of armed protection for aid providers. The possibility of using armed protection to secure not just an agency, but an area, thereby giving private security a limited public function, is a little used practice that may deserve more exploration. 
2.2. Management
Who provides the armed protection?
There is an array of possibilities:
•	agency staff protect themselves;
•	the agency has its own armed staff;
•	the agency hires a militia as protection;
•	the agency hires a commercial security company as protection;
•	protection is provided by the national police force;
•	protection is provided by the national army;
•	protection is provided by a rebel group;
•	protection is provided by UN civilian police; or
•	protection is provided by UN military troops.

The question of who can best provide armed protection is informed by considerations of principle, availability, effectiveness, cost and image. Different agencies make different judgments in this regard. There is also the consideration of legality, i.e. whether the providers of armed protection do so within the framework of the country’s laws.
*	Armed protection by national security forces.
As a matter of principle, some agencies may prefer the national authorities that are responsible for law and order and the protection of citizens, i.e. the national police and the national army. It may be necessary to provide material support, such as hired vehicles or fuel, to increase the effectiveness of the police or army unit.
Humanitarian convoys, for example, have been protected by national army troops in the Ogaden, in eastern Ethiopia (post 1992) and in Sierra Leone (prior to 1997). Police protection was sought when, in 1995, there was a rapid increase in the rate of crime in Luanda, Angola.
Problems may arise when the national army is itself a party to the conflict. Accepting its protection may then negatively affect the "neutral" image of the agency, thereby increasing, rather than reducing, the risk. Problems may also arise when the national army is involved in robbery, looting and extortion from civilians, as was the case in Sierra Leone, or when the police are seen as part of the repressive machinery of a government that is being violently challenged by an armed opposition.
Problems may arise when the police themselves are corrupt, or may harbor a number of suspected war criminals, as in Bosnia. Problems may also arise when the police has no resources to combat crime or banditry, and are therefore ineffective.
*	Armed protection by organized resistance and rebel movements.
In a number of instances, agencies, particularly NGOs, have effectively relied on protection from organized rebel movements. This has certainly been the case in contexts of solidarity with armed opposition movements, especially in the 1980s, such as the guerrilla in El Salvador, the Eritrean and Tigrinean Liberation Fronts during the Ethiopian civil war, or the "mujahedin" opposition to the Soviet-backed Kabul-regime in Afghanistan. But there may be factionalized civil wars, such as in Liberia, where humanitarian agencies more or less have to rely on the "security" provided by the faction in whose territory they operate, irrespective of whether there is a sense of "solidarity" with a "just struggle." This clearly has implications for the image of "neutrality" of that particular agency, but often it affects the humanitarian enterprise's image as a whole. There may be trade-offs in terms of the independence of programming and implementation.
*	Armed protection by UN police or UN peacekeepers.
Particularly during civil war situations, where national armies and the national police may have become ineffective or no longer seen as legitimate, agencies may give preference to UN troops. In principle, the UN CIVPOL might be given preference over UN military "blue helmets," but here again there may be a question of effectiveness. On the other hand, humanitarian agencies may wish to distance themselves from UN troops, on the grounds that they are deployed under a politically-determined mandate, one that usually represents the political interests of a few international powers. A UN intervention is or seldom remains perceived as "neutral"; thus, seeking protection from UN forces may compromise the image of the humanitarian agency. Another likely scenario, as happened with the US in Somalia, is that troops originally deployed to protect the relief operation become involved in the politics of the war itself. It may be difficult for a humanitarian agency to then disengage and distance itself if the international military forces were being used as armed protection.
*	Armed protection by a militia.
Protection may be sought through the hiring of an armed militia. There is the risk, as happened in Somalia, that the agencies hereby stimulate a predatory economy and become trapped in a protection racket. Armed militias may be the least desirable option. Armed militias providing protection for money are a phenomenon somewhere in between a rebel movement, a private security company and a criminal gang. Unlike a rebel movement, they may no longer have a political motive and purpose to their actions, but rather trade in power and violence as an economic strategy. Unlike private security companies, they may not operate by certain rules and regulations, and they may not be controlled by the clear authority of and service contract with their client. The distinctions may not always be immediately clear.
*	Armed protection by a private security company.
The agency may hire a commercial security company. This should be a security company that is properly licensed in the country of operation, and has professionally-trained staff. Such companies may be national, but the trend is for an increasing presence of international companies. Businesses have a longer tradition of using private security companies than humanitarian agencies. Political actors may also use private security companies.
Resorting to private security companies may, however, be rejected as a matter of principle: it contributes to the privatization of violence, and the abdication of responsibility, by the state authorities, for protection and security. There are also difficulties in properly assessing the nature and true identity of private security companies. Just as a company offering mine-clearance services may have another branch that produces land mines, private security companies may be involved in more ethically-questionable activities in the same country or elsewhere in the world. Some private security firms offer only crime-prevention and security services, others also offer logistical support and still others provide military advice and may get involved in combat activities as a hired, private army. In recent years, some resource-rich beleaguered governments have made more use of the strategic engagement of internationally-available private armies in conflicts. Given that private security companies are for hire by anyone who can afford them, and given that discreteness is often an aspect of their way of operating, humanitarian agencies cannot easily find out how ethically and politically uncompromised a company may be. The use of private security firms may also affect the image of the agency in other ways: only the rich national elite and foreign business interests can afford to hire private security services.
*	Armed protection by the agency itself.
An agency can also decide to organize its own armed protection. In theory, there are two options: to give staff the arms to protect themselves or to have armed guards protect the unarmed staff. Self-protection with arms carries considerable risks. Even when an agency may feel that armed protection is acceptable under certain conditions, few, if any, would consider that arming its staff is compatible with the identity of a humanitarian aid worker. Doubts may arise when there is a high incidence of rape or burglary/robbery. In such a case, would it be useful to provide staff with a weapon with which to defend themselves either at home or while going out in the evening? Apart from the question of principle, there is a legal consideration: what is the agency's liability if a female staff member injures or kills a sexual assailant? There are also security considerations: there is always a risk that an assailant may act more violently if he expects his intended victim to be armed, or the risk that the victim will be overwhelmed and the weapon used against him or her. In that sense, carrying arms may increase rather than decrease the risk. Finally, one should not carry arms unless one knows how to use them and is psychologically prepared to do so.
Using armed guards may be an alternative. Once again, there are legal and security considerations. Can the humanitarian agency obtain a legal license to have armed staff? What are the legal (or customary law) and financial implications if an agency staff member injures or kills someone, even in self-defense? And finally, can one assume that outsiders distinguish between armed and unarmed staff?
In the early 90s, agency offices in Peshawar, Pakistan, became a target for organized burglaries and sometimes terrorist attack. A gang of armed burglars broke into offices at night to steal computer equipment, cash and sometimes vehicles. Other agencies had grenades thrown at their premises at night, though whether this was the result of internal conflict and corruption rackets being threatened with exposure or whether the attacks contained a more "political" message, was not clear. A number of agencies had armed nightguards in their offices and there were many arms around at the time, though the agency arms would normally belong an individual staff member and not necessarily be registered.
Where agencies have hired armed militia or have their own armed staff, disputes and problems may occur in the context of a disarmament exercise carried out by the national authorities or a UN forces. Will the agency give up its own armed protection if it perceives that the criminals and bandits have not been effectively disarmed?
How is the armed protection managed?
A number of issues have to be thought through in advance, especially in the case of having armed staff or hiring armed protection.
•	Internal decisionmaking.
Who in the aid agency makes the decision/approves the use of armed protection? Who needs to be informed? Are there criteria, and is a schedule spelled out to regularly review the use of armed protection? Who in the country-office has daily responsibility for the management of guards e.g. the office manager, the logistics officer?
•	In-house expertise.
What knowledge and experience will the relevant managers need to deal with such a situation? In-country managers may, for example, have to draw up tenders, and assess the bids from private security companies. Inquiries may have to be made about the professionalism and reliability of a potential service provider. Questions may arise about the criteria for the selection of guards in terms of their training and experience with handling weapons, and the professionalism with which they can do a job.
•	Contractual specifications.
A contract may include clauses e.g. to the effect that guards assigned to an organization will not rotate with those of other clients. It may stipulate certain guard selection criteria e.g. age, health, literacy, no use of alcohol or drugs, and no other employment, at least not to the effect that adequate sleep cannot be had. Specifications may be included regarding the requirements of supervisors and the minimum standards for supervision. Equally minimum standards for recruit and in-service training may be specified: basic training topics such as local law and the power of arrest, fires and explosives, log keeping, office evacuation, vehicle search procedures, package and mail search, first aid, etc. Where no contract is established, e.g. in case of the police providing protection, some or all of these issues may still be raised in discussions with senior authorities.
•	Salary.
An appropriate salary scale will have to be found to balance the wish to avoid stimulating a lucrative market in privatized security with the need to maintain motivation and commitment. Guards often work long and unsociable hours and do a potentially dangerous job. Too low a salary will probably lead to low standards of performance.
•	Command.
To whom are the armed guards answerable, who has the authority of command, who is in charge of their discipline? If police or soldiers are detailed to provide armed protection, what is the relative authority of their commander versus that of the agency manager?
•	Rules of engagement.
Are there clear rules of engagement? Who sets them and who ensures that the guards have fully understood them? These concern not only the circumstances under which the guards can use violence and the proportionality of their violence. They may have to include further procedures regarding body search and what to do when someone refuses to be thus searched, whether the personal bodyguards of a visitor can keep their weapons or how far to go in the pursuit of robbers and attackers.
•	Disciplinary procedures.
What disciplinary procedures apply to what sort of offense or non-performance of duty? Under whose disciplinary procedures do guards not on the agency payroll fall?
•	Weaponry and other equipment.
Agreements may have to be reached about what type of weaponry the guards will use (e.g. single shot guns vs machine-guns), who is responsible for the checking of the weapons, their maintenance and ammunition. It is also recommended to specify who will be responsible for the provision of other equipment, such as rainproof clothing, flashlights, whistles, etc.
•	Vehicles.
Armed guards may not have their own vehicles. Decisions will have to be made concerning if and when they can use agency vehicles. Alternatively, vehicles may be rented for them, but the risk of these vehicles becoming damaged in a crossfire needs to be anticipated.

In the early 90s, the Ethiopian army provided escorts to the humanitarian convoys servicing the refugee camps for Somalis in the Ogaden. The soldiers, however, did not have vehicles. After discussion, some aid agencies agreed to make available two pick-ups from which the agency logos were removed. Problems arose when the army was seen using these vehicles for other chores, such as the transport of building materials.
In the same setting, a problem also arose when an agency vehicle was hijacked at gunpoint in one of the refugee camps. The army had stationed some soldiers in the camp who, however, had no vehicles. The army command turned particularly angry with another aid agency, whose staff had refused the soldiers in the camp the use of their agency vehicle to pursue the bandits on the grounds that this was against the agency's policy.
•	Liability.
Very clear agreements about respective liabilities will have to be made. These will have to take into account mutual contractual obligations, but perhaps also customary law. Who will be responsible for the injury or death of a guard, an assailant or a by-stander in an exchange of fire? Can the agency's liability be restricted to actions by the guards that strictly fall within the agreed terms or are only carried out following orders? 
•	Ending of contract.
Are there clearly spelled out and mutually agreed upon criteria and procedures regarding the termination of the contract with the particular guard or organization providing the armed protection? Are the obligations of the agency and the limits to these clearly stated? Note that the agency may wish to end a contract quite suddenly and for reasons that should be anticipated: dissatisfaction with a guard or the group providing security, improvement of the situation such that armed protection is no longer needed, the agency's decision to withdraw its staff and suspend or end its operations, etc. The need for armed protection is a dynamic variable. Shorter term, renewable contracts allow the service to be terminated when no longer required. Alternatively, however, it may expose the agency to inflating price demands.
2.3. Image
The use of armed protection influences the public perception of a humanitarian agency; it could provide fertile ground for those wishing to portray a bad image of the agency or of humanitarian assistance in general. 
The agency can be perceived as belonging to the social stratum of the wealthy, those who can afford armed protection in a climate of generalized crime and lawlessness. A private security firm protecting aid agencies could also be protecting leading political figures, which may give rise to unwanted associations.
A hired militia may belong to a particular ideological or tribal grouping, in which case the agency may become associated with a particular social segment of a society in conflict. The deployment of guns may be construed as the agency becoming part of a conflict, and may be further exploited in accusations that humanitarian assistance is used as a cover for other activities, such as the smuggling of arms to an opposing party.
Some of the perception-influencing factors that an agency may wish to consider are: visibility, attitude and degree of association.
High visibility of the presence of armed protection may be seen as desirable, for it enhances the deterrent effect. On the other hand, it also portrays a more aggressive image of the agency and may draw more attention to it than is desirable. Visibility also relates to the question whether guards should be easily identifiable, either by a uniform or an identifying garment such as cap or arm band. If weapons and guards are to have a deterrent effect, the conclusion would be to make them visible. If they are to act as discreet surveillance or an effective defense force, they should not be made easily identifiable or highly visible.
The attitude of the armed guards will strongly influence perception: do they appear very disciplined and obedient to a clear command or not, do they behave aggressively or in a firm, but polite, way?
In most cases, a humanitarian agency will want to maintain a certain "distance" from those carrying guns. This is an advantage of using uniformed guards from a private security firm or the police. The provision of generalized, zonal security (e.g. patrolling a road or a neighborhood, checkpoints at regular intervals, etc.) also portrays a looser association with those carrying guns than having an escort specifically for agency staff or convoys.
But the circumstances may be such that such "distanced" protection is not possible or that an agency may choose to portray a firm and assertive image by using armed protection, such as by having armed staff or a hired militia, or by "blending in" with a rebel movement that also provides protection. A decision can be made to portray the image of an agency is ready to defend itself, rather than appearing essentially defenseless and dependent on others for protection. Different agencies make different choices.
It should be noted that NGOs in particular, unlike the UN and the ICRC, tend to make very situation-specific choices based on an assessment of the short-term advantages and disadvantages. The UN and the ICRC tend to be more concerned about their global and longer-term image, a factor that may strongly influence their choices in a specific situation.
It is advisable to articulate and keep under review the factors that lead to a specific decision.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS
rules of engagement	the stipulation concerning under which contextual and procedural conditions force can be used, and the level of force that can be used.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Council of Delegates (1995) "Armed Protection of Humanitarian Assistance." working paper of the ICRC and IFRC
Pugh, M. (1998) "The Role of Armed Protection in Humanitarian Action." paper presented at the ECHO-ICRC conference on "Humanitarian Action: Perception and security." Lisboa
Shearer, D. (1998) "Private Armies and Military Intervention." Adelphi Paper no. 316, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
Suhrke, A. (1998) "Dilemmas of Protection. The Log of the Kigali Batallion." in Journal of International Peacekeeping 5(2)1-18
UNICEF nd. Employing and Managing Guard Forces.
Van Brabant, K. (forthcoming) "Security and Protection in Peacekeeping. A critical reading of the Belgian inquiry into the 1994 events in Rwanda." in Journal of International Peacekeeping 

ANNEX: KEY QUESTIONS REGARDING ARMED PROTECTION
A. Principle
•	Is armed protection compatible with humanitarian action?
•	Is armed protection compatible with advocacy against the arms race or against arms sales?
•	Is armed protection compatible with a policy that aid workers should never carry guns or that no weapons are allowed in aid agency vehicles or compounds?
•	Is armed protection that improves the security of the aid agency but not, directly that of civilians, acceptable?
•	Should aid agencies in the same context follow their own practices or seek agreement on a common practice towards armed protection?
•	Should you work at all in an area where armed protection may be required?
•	Can it be acceptable to pay for armed protection or should one, as a matter of principle, never pay for guns?

B. Practice
•	Under what conditions would you use armed protection?
•	For what purposes would you use armed protection?
•	How can the scope of armed protection be extended to benefit a maximum number of civilians and aid workers?
•	Who, in your context, is best suited to provide armed protection?
•	Are you clear about the various aspects of managing armed protection?
-	internal decisionmaking
-	in-house expertise
-	contractual specifications (including ending of contract)
-	salary levels
-	command
-	rules of engagement
-	disciplinary procedures
-	weaponry and other equipment
-	vehicles
-	liability
•	How do you think the use of armed protection influences the agency’s image/the perception of various groups?

CASE STUDY: ARMED PROTECTION IN N. IRAQ
Many aid agencies after the Gulf War have habitually worked with armed guards in Kurdish northern Iraq.
Initially, there was a stronger presence of UN guards. These were policemen, provided by governments to the UN. Their major responsibilities included checking the radio systems and monitoring radio channels, the UN security plan, patrolling areas where problems had been signaled and escorting aid trucks and international aid personnel. However, being armed only with pistols in an environment where many carried Kalashnikovs made them vulnerable to ambushes. Over time, their number diminished and they no longer had the human resources to provide escorts and for extensive patrolling.
Many NGOs also hired "peshmergas" or local armed men. These would come on the NGO payroll and be directly managed by the NGO. Their main function was to guard the international staff and the NGO premises and vehicles (not hired vehicles). Shortly after the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein's regime was believed to have offered a price for killing international staff in northern Iraq, some of whom were present without Baghdad's consent, and a number were indeed murdered. Another, targeted, source of threat against an expatriate might have arisen from his culturally unacceptable behavior towards a Kurdish woman or a liaison with one. Vehicles and premises had to be protected against armed robbery, which was not uncommon in an area suffering from sanctions, displacement and unemployment.
Typically, international staff would always move with two bodyguards. When leaving an agency vehicle, one would stay to guard the vehicle. At least one agency allowed the expatriate to choose the bodyguards with which he or she felt most comfortable. NGOs using armed protection tended to drive with two vehicles on longer journeys. One would carry an international staff member with one or two guards, the second one, the so-called "gunship" would have perhaps five more armed guards, one of whom might be armed with a heavier machine-gun. Some would practice vehicle movements under different scenarios whereby the "gunship" maneuvered to protect the other vehicle. No armed guards were used, however, in UN vehicles or UN convoys.
Typically, an agency would choose, after an interview and perhaps a practical test, who to hire. Some accepted a list of recommended candidates from the local administration, but then make it clear that none of these could be politically or militarily active, and that recruitment would be open beyond such a list. In Iraqi Kurdistan, the most important political and military division is that between the PDK and the PUK party. Many aid agencies typically traveled between the respective territories controlled by these parties. Some chose guards for their bases from the party in control of the territory on which the base was located. Others would choose guards from the smaller parties, such as communists, who, in the struggle between the PDK and the PUK, were perceived as neutral.
The guards were under the supervision of a guard commander who was answerable to an expatriate. Both the guards and the guard commander worked against a job description.
The guards would bring their own weapon and ammunition. One agency had a policy under which the guards were to act as a deterrent. As such, they were allowed to carry the visible kalashnikov, but not hand grenades or handguns. An agency specified that guards, while on duty, always had to have a pre-determined number of rounds of ammunition on them. Ammunition spent while off duty would have to be replaced by the guard. Ammunition spent while on duty or during authorized target practice would be replaced by the agency.
Rules of Engagement typically emphasized that a guard was only allowed to fire and direct his fire towards someone when it was clear that attacking fire was directed towards him or the international staff member. A report of each firing incident, specifying the number of rounds fired, was mandatory.
One agency tied contracts for armed guards to its funding cycles, with no guarantee for continued employment. Guards could be dismissed under standard disciplinary procedures, which could include sleeping on duty or accidentally firing one's gun. The use of locally hired armed guards in northern Iraq did not turn into a protection racket as it did in Somalia.
As in Somalia, local custom requires blood money payments when someone hurts or kills another person, even in self-defense.