



# עמותת סיירת חרוב



## Haruv--- the tree



The Haruv tree (known as carob tree) is a green tree all year round with 10-15 meter high, and can be found in a large section of Israel primarily in the Galilee, Jerusalem's mountains and near the Jordan Valley. The fruit, shaped like a sword, is low in water but very high in sugar content. It's eaten by man and animal.

### Sayeret Haruv 1965--1974

#### ---Introduction.

Since the establishment of Israel, the IDF (Israel Defense Force) faced the dilemma of resource allocation between two primary responsibilities: the preparation of the army for the next war and daily routine security assignments. Deterrence are the foundations of Israel's military defense, and therefore, building military operational plans, organization, and training often contradict the concept of preventive military action. That constitutes the underlying operational doctrine of ongoing security, which is based on conventional defensive tactic methods such as: border patrol, observations, and blocking infiltrators. In the early 1950<sup>th</sup> Israel faced an increased degree of hostile activities from its neighbors, to encountered circumstances the IDF assumed a more aggressive approach by the formation of the "**101**" commando unit led by Ariel Sharon. Southern Command developed an alternative approach to deal with the routine security tasks, it had established in 1955 an active specialized reconnaissance unit (*i.e., sayeret*), named 'Sayeret Shaked' (*i.e., Almond*). This unit focused on advanced defensive operations, and was a model for the construction of the related security units established by the Northern Command - "Sayeret Egoz" (*i.e., Nut*) and the Central Command - "Sayeret Haruv" (*i.e., Carob*). (Note, that Israeli defense is subdivided into three geographical regions the Northern, Central, and Southern Commands, each with differed topography, weather, and hostile neighbors).



After the Six Day War the Commands realized that the deployment along the new borders introduced additional and unanticipated problems that necessitated changes in the status and perception of the defense security units, and their tasks increased accordingly. Hence, in addition to basic training of the infantry soldiers, the combatants of the units: Shaked, Haruv and Egoz, received extensive and intensive training in intelligence, observation, raids, sabotage, ambushes, tracking invaders, and eliminating terrorists. The units were equipped with special measures such as discovery observation instruments and electronic surveillance which were new to the army at that time. It should be noted that the units, "Shaked", "Egoz" and "Haruv", were employed against terrorist targets just as the U.S. today applies special Marine and Seal forces against terrorist targets worldwide.

*(Note, the term "Sayeret" is in Hebrew **a reconnaissance unit**, almost any combat battalion has a Sayeret; however, the Sayeret(s) of the Commands and combat-brigades, like the paratrooper and Golani, consist of selected fighters whose physical, mental and soldiering skills are greatly advanced, in Israel it's considered an honor to be selected and served in such unit.)*

### **Sayeret Haruv.**

Beginning in 1965, Sayeret Haruv was built as a small paratrooper reconnaissance unit, consisting of four mobile teams on jeeps, with a total of 26 fighters. The unit was reinforced in March 1966 to 40 fighters operating in the Paratroopers Brigade intelligence (the Command sought to avoid handling small units, and left the **Haruv** under the command of the Paratrooper Brigade).

Towards the end of 1966 with increasing security concerns along the topographically complex border with Jordan, Chief of Staff - Yitzhak Rabin, decided on the establishment of the Central Command reconnaissance battalion that constituted a specialized force for regular security missions and special operations. The Command decided to reinforce Sayeret Haruv, and re-defined its mission. The objective was to implement operational lessons gained by Sayeret Shaked, in the security assignments along the border with Jordan.

Following the reinforcement Sayeret Haruv was composed of two companies, each of four patrol teams of 10 fighters led by a Lieutenant and a tracker. These units were highly mobile on jeeps and command cars. (Additionally, the squad included maintenance and services.) With its command squad, the Sayeret contained about 100 commando soldiers.

This build-up was done in a hurry. During the period preceding the Six-Day War, Haruv performed surveillances and ambush tasks along the Jordanian border (near Beit Guvrin, Latrun to Jerusalem). Terrorist actions against civilian targets were on the rise. Terrorists infiltrated the Qalqiliya area and damaged the nearby railroad. The Haruv Commander set a number of soldiers in civilian clothes as bait on the railroad, while the Sayeret's snipers occupied positions of control points on the railway sector. It was a special pattern of action compared to routine activities, and the terrorists did not act in this zone again. The Sayeret mounted increased patrols and ambushes around Jerusalem in the Latrun area in May 1967, during the Independence Day military parade in Jerusalem.

### **---Sareyet Haruv in 'Six-Day War' – 1967.**

At the start of Six-Day War, Sayeret Haruv-- reinforced with AMLs armored vehicles (carrying a 90 mm cannon) and another infantry company-- was the spearhead of the 4th armored Brigade. Deployed in the *Ayalon Valley*, it progressed into *Beit Horon*-- bypassing the famous *Latrun police building*-- and targeted a fortified post of the Jordanian army- that was quickly abandoned. The unit leapt further and entered the military camp unopposed, when gunfire was opened from the hill overlooking the base by an Egyptian commandos battalion (stationed there as help to the Jordanian army). Another company, that was at the back and out of the fire, then attacked the Egyptian commandos along the ridge from the west, while the armored column on the road covered with fire from the north. The Egyptian commandos abandoned the hill and retreated but number of them got captured by Haruv combatants. Haruv had come out of this confrontation with only one slightly injured officer.

From there, the unit participated--along with the armor and airborne battalion--in the conquest at *Junction Bittonia*,

where a battalion of the Jordanian Legion was stationed with cannons and mortars. The combined force broke through the Jordanian system, in June/7.

On June 8<sup>th</sup>, Haruv served as an advanced force to the armored Division "Harel" on the road from Ramallah to the east, and near the *University of Bir-Olive* it encountered a Jordanian Legion patrol force, which was quickly dispersed.

Sayeret Haruv was an advanced reconnaissance unit and was not structured to function as an Infantry Regiment during a "conventional" war. The successes of the unit during the Six-Days War were mainly due to commanders-- all veterans of the paratroopers Brigade-- that with skill and profanely had lead the unit, and the short duration of the war with Jordanian.



After the war, the Central Command and Sayeret Haruv encountered entirely different situations: the border stretching mainly along the Jordan River and the Dead-Sea, the area under control containing the West Bank with its towns and villages, and with its very difficult tortuous topography.

Right after the war and before the IDF locked up the long border with Jordan along the Jordan-river, many armed squads of the Fatah (the Palestinian terrorist organization) had crossed the river and infiltrated the West bank, supplying with weapons, ammunition and explosives. *(Note. A large segment of the terrorists came from the commando groups of the Palestinian Liberation Army, especially from the Iraqi 421 battalion, Qadsia's unit, which settled in northern Jordan, and the Fedayeen Egyptian Palestinian 141 battalion - established and trained by the Egyptians to create terror cells in the West Bank and terror activities within Israel - the Green Line on the map.)*

Many of the Fatah's draftees joined out of patriotic reasons, but there were others who joined due to financial motives. The new draftees received only basic field training, small arms and explosives, brief political guidance and some lessons of Hebrew. The local volunteers were sent to renew ties with their families and friends and to mobilize the ranks of the organization. They were also required to prepare hideouts within and outside the villages. Caches of weapons and ammunition were buried and concealed in several villages. During the few months after the war several hundred terrorists were organized in villages in the West Bank.

At the end of 1967, systematic action had been taken by the IDF, which performed village by village scans, a great deal of the intelligence was provided by local collaborators. This operation forced the terrorists to go into hiding in the hills, wadis (i.e., ravines and/or gorges) and caves outside the villages and to be careful in their contact with local residents, fearing denunciation and extradition. However, by using persuasion and terror, many attempts were made by the Fatah to establish local committees in each village, as well as in urban neighborhoods. *(Note. A strategic objective of establishing an independent government controlled by the Fatah was also set Cells throughout the West Bank sought to encourage the residents of the towns and villages to acts of civil disobedience, strikes and demonstrations against the IDF in the belief that these could lead to civil and armed popular revolution.)*

### **Sayeret Haruv after the Six-Day War ---- 1967-1968.**

As a result the Central Command (October 1967), had expanded Sayeret Haruv to 160 soldiers, consisting of 4 companies. When one was in training, the rest were in action.

The terrorist activity had dictated Haruv missions; there were mainly three task forces. The first company operated in the West Bank, its task was to forcefully eliminate the terrorist cells especially in urban centers, and to hunt down those who tried to hide in the wadis and caves. A second company operated in the Jordan Valley to trap and ambush invaders (mostly through the Jordan River). The third unit was assigned to the operational pursuit, chase, hunt and elimination of the invading terrorists.

### **---Patrol activities on the mountain of Judea and Samaria.**

During September-December 1967 Sayeret Haruv (in collaboration with the ISA) pursued and arrested the terrorists who tried to establish bases throughout Judea and Samaria. Activity had been characterized by collecting intelligence, surprise and deception, as well as, speed and accuracy. Since there were a number of forces from various IDF units in the field, maximum coordination among all forces had to be maintained. This meant precise schedules, field orientation, secrecy and compartmentalization was paramount even after the operation. Raids on civilian terrorists, villages, caves and cities were now the daily activity of Sayeret Haruv (along with Paratroopers and Golani infantry soldiers).

Haruv soldiers received special training in fighting in the mountainous terrain and "purification" of caves. Fighting necessitated action and gun-fire along the contour lines in mountainous areas. The approach taken to the opening and purification of the caves was examined and tested using smoke and stun grenades, "nevertheless, this was not enough..." said the Haruv commander; "...we lost many good soldiers until we learned to tackle this problem".

The first phase consisted in an operation that was called by the IDF the "wave cave" in which many members of the terrorists' organizations were arrested. At times the Fatah fighters were forced out of the villages and populated areas seeking shelter in caves near the villages from which they received assistance.

### **---Jordan Valley Activity-- "The Ambush".**

Laying ambushes on main terrorist infiltration routes was a routine assignment. Hundreds of ambushes (an ambush squad having 6-8 fighters) were laid every night along the long border from Eilat in the south to the northern sector of the Jordan Valley. Locations of the ambushes were determined by the infiltration routes of terrorists or based on intelligence reports.

The Sayeret soldiers took part in daily ambushes. Some of the ambushes were on wheels (Jeeps) and others reclining (i.e., lying belly down). The Haruv was one of the first combat units in the IDF to be rigged with an advanced infrared night-vision or star-lighting amplifier



(SLS). (Note. These sophisticated night vision devices were active and radiate an infrared beam to allow viewing or shooting at night, these devices were far superior to those which IDF equipped the other regular combat division.)

Ambush is a difficult task for a combatant that was ordered to lie down in an ambush about 20 nights per month (lying in ambush for three nights in a row, with the fourth day to rest). As one of Haruv commander described:

***"This was an erodible routine for the soldier due to many sleepless nights, and in the summer when the Jordan-Valley is extremely hot and the flies and heat do not allow for a real rest during the day. In fact, the water in the valley was so hot; you could not drink or bathe with it. Keep in mind that these soldiers were very often called to participate in pursuits, in addition to the current routine duties and maintenance of the sophisticated equipment at the disposal of the company".***

**---A typical successful ambush encounter: the night of 3-4 May 1970.**

On the evening of May 3<sup>rd</sup>, Sayeret Haruv ambush forces were placed between the "Shaked" and "Eerez" two military posts. In the area of *Wadi Malih* lay three ambush teams from Haruv and teams of the Nahal (airborne unit) also under the command Haruv. Mobile turret (APC) security and the extraction team under Zvika Potashnik were settled at the security center about 400 meters between two ambushes. At 10 p.m., the turret operator discovered, using night vision binoculars, three figures near the fence. The operator called the attention of the ambush commander that also began to follow the figures through infrared binoculars. The three approached the fence's perimeter, cut it, and folded it inward. Two of the terrorists remained to secure and mark the location of the breach, while the third went back to lead the main group. A few minutes later, the turret operator spotted about 15 terrorists moving in two packed columns toward the fence. Potashnik, the ambush commander, ordered the turret operator to fire once the invaders reached the breach in the fence. At 10:30 p.m., a volley of 70-80 gun fires was shot toward the terrorists who converged toward the break. This generated a cloud of dust and the ambush teams who were in close range opened fire at the images. The turret operator continued to fire as the terrorists were caught in the two ambushes of Haruv and many were hit, injured or killed. After 20 minutes, additional forces arrived under the battalion commander, and the some terrorists managed to ran away. The force's fire continued and occasionally shot caliber(52 mm) mortar bombs at the approximate area of the terrorists' withdrawal. At 4 a.m., while the teams scanned the area they spotted 4 terrorists carrying one wounded running in a spire trying to escape to the east toward Jordan. This was east of the fence, just about 150 meters from the ambush. Two of the figures fled north along the fence, and

were fired upon, but managed to escape, and were captured two days later in the fish-ponds, near *Kibbutz Tirat Zvi*. In the morning there was another search; 10 terrorists were killed between the two fence settings, five terrorists killed east of fences, 6 terrorists were seriously injured east of fences, and three more drowned in the Jordan River. Two days later, a terrorist came out of the bush with his hands raised and turned himself in.

### ---The Pursuits - "chase-and-combat".

Compared to the ambush activity, the pursuits, from the point of view of the soldiers, provided better results in fighting terrorists. The "Pursuit" was an operative way of engagement and battling terrorists in those days - throughout the Jordan Valley, the mountains of Samaria and Judea. Sayeret Haruv more than any other unit operated in this capacity throughout the years. It was recognized as thoroughly knowing the area, specialized in guerrilla warfare, and familiarized with the modus operandi of the terrorists and their ways. Thus, Haruv has become the central pillar in blocking the Jordan Valley from terrorist attack and infiltration. The pursuit concept was built on small combat teams lead by a company commander and other officers. Every pursuit team had a machine gun and 52 mm mortar in addition to the personal weapons of the combatants.

In the beginning, the IDF placed observation posts that were stationed at locations overlooking the Jordan River. The hills and wadis around were blocked by barbed wires, mines, and booby traps. Many terrorist cells were still able to penetrate mountain ridges, and only around March 1968, IDF began building the fence line of the system while accumulating experience in the theory of pursuit.

Early in the morning a small Haruv reconnaissance troops

was on its way to probe and discover traces and paths of terrorist penetration (*In the beginning, the method of pursuit was largely a based on the ability of the Bedouin trackers of Haruv, and their commander Salah.*) The Sayeret Haruv pursuit teams were on constant alert; especially while reconnaissance patrols with its scout teams were on their way. The exposure of penetration was made usually by the scouts who examined the path along the border and the fences; when a trace of entry was reported, they alerted the forces of Haruv who went into action. In addition, the Infantry Regiment that had been in charge of the region in which the chase was conducted, activated a squad with 81mm mortars and recoilless rifles, and other units as needed. Combat teams scoured the ridges around the axis of penetration. Once they discovered the hiding place of the terrorists, the pursuit



forces were placed in positions of fire and fighter teams prevented any possibility of escape.

Sometimes, the commander of the pursuit preferred not to wait for the recoilless rifle, or tank, and head on an infantry assault - due to the concern that darkness will fall, and the fear that the terrorists will escape under cover of darkness. In some cases, the pursuit group of the terrorists and the situation would not allow encountered a teams suddenly any time before the assault and firefight occurred. Sudden mishaps caused casualties to the pursuit force, and additional forces battled to rescue them

### **Typical example is Sartaba pursuit on April 1969.**

On April 20, the traces of entry of about six terrorists were discovered on a dirt road, next the pursuit forces had been to the Jericho highway. With the discovery of these traces called and the chase began to establish contact with the terrorists.

The pursuit was conducted under the Commander of Haruv. Footprints led to a steep wadi slope, and at the bottom of the ravine many caves and niches were found. The wadi was scanned by a force under the command of Yoav who split the force into two combat teams. One team took positions on the northern slope while shooting at the caves on the southern slope, while the second squad was directed to slide down the southern slope, shooting at the caves on the northern slope.

Yoav who headed the second squad identified with his binoculars, a leg of a terrorist sticking out of a cave on the northern slope. He opened fire and the body rolled out of the cave to the bottom of the valley and was found dead. With the discovery of the terrorists, a helicopter hovered over the caves and called the terrorists to surrender; only one came out with his hands raised. Another one opened fire from the cave at bottom of the wadi, striking and injuring one of the Haruv fighter (Avital Offer).

When the smoke cleared the team identified a terrorist who tried to escape the wadi and was killed. Now it was clear that other terrorists were in that area. The crew of the recoilless rifles fired several shells at a cave nearby and in consequence, the white "cafia" was raised from behind the rocks as another terrorist surrendered. Two others were identified in the wadis' channel. When the team opened fire at them, the terrorists fell, but it was not clear whether or not they were hit. Now the team activated an 81 mm



mortar and bombed the suspect area. The Haruv forces closed in on both sides of the wadi, and scanning was performed, four terrorists were dead in the southern slope of the valley

Four terrorists were killed and 2 captured, while among the chase force, one was wounded. The six terrorists had been sent to raise havoc in the civilian population.

*Note, the number of officers from other IDF units who wanted and did take part in pursuits grew in time, not only due to their desire to take part in the fighting, but also from the need to build on the experience of fighting on the operational level.*

*It was not possible for a commander to conduct a pursuit from the war room, even if a commander would be equipped with state of arts maps, aerial photographs, and contacts. The commander must be able to assess the fluctuating facts and situation of the "chase-and-combat" and make decisions, real time. The foremost principles of the Israeli fighting troops, at that time, as the Commander of the Valley Brigade stated was, "commander of the troops must be at the head of and leading the first storm of battle". Thus, the commanders should have access to immediate alerts from within the pursuit teams, and emphasis was placed on their role in heading the forces on the mission. However, in general, this tactic of the IDF did often damage the concept of 'pursuit'. Commanders that led the stricken. As time passed, and improved combat chase were first to attack and first to be capability of the terrorists grew, there was a rising number of senior commanders afflicted in the pursuits.*

*Moreover, there were many cases in which IDF soldiers were killed by terrorists as a result of the lack of attention at the end of the chase, when it seemed that the battle had ended.*

*---The realization that the tactic in the fight against the terrorists has to be changed came rather slowly, and only at **1969** the new command of Haruv had discontinued unnecessary, but brave, storming of caves or and hidden locations.*

Of the 30 pursuits of IDF at the eastern sector on the Jordanian border (in the time period of April 1968 to March 1969): 96 terrorists were killed and 66 terrorists were captured by IDF forces along the Jordanian border pursuits, of which 89 terrorists were killed and 46 captured in the territory of the Jordan Valley Brigade.

During the chases in these years many officers and fighters were killed and wounded, among them some senior commanders of the IDF combat units: the **Jordan Valley Brigade Commander Col. Eric** and **Operations officer Captain Gadi** (both from the paratroopers), **Sayeret Haruv Commander Lt. Col. Zvi Ofer, Lt. Col. Moshe, (commander airborne**

**battalion "Nahal") and his deputy Major Doron, Major Yosi (Senior Operation Officer, Valley Brigade) and Major Hanan.**

### **--- Marine path - Dead Sea sector**

In the spring of 1969 the Fatah seeking alternative infiltration routes, began to take the path of the Dead Sea to introduce fighters and weapons, to the region of Mount Hebron and the Gaza Strip. These activities have received aid from the Bedouin tribes in the Judea Desert.

In July 1969, it became clear that the terrorists are taking advantage of the lack of awareness of the IDF and failure of the operation of agents in this sector. Terrorists penetrated and passed fighters, weapons and explosives from the northern section of the Dead Sea to the south of the Dead Sea in the Safi area. Although the zones of crossing have been known, routine defense activity was poor. Finally, the Central Command Chief ordered to increase patrols and aerial photography along the Dead Sea, to try and identify the location of the terrorists' boat docks, to mount, foot, and wheel riding patrols along the shores of the Dead Sea, and to prepare a "dirt road" fence east of the highway that was built in those days.

### **Raids on the eastern side of the Dead Sea**

During operation " Cardinal B ", in January 1970, Sayeret Haruv, patrolling the mouth of wadi Eton, found equipment used by Fatah to cross the Dead Sea. During the following months, the Sayeret continued to patrol the mouth of the Arnon River, Zara, and Eton spring at the eastern shore of the Dead Sea. In most cases, the forces discovered terrorists' equipment and motor boats, but in mid-February while scanning the estuary *Arnon*, they tackled terrorists, killing two and capturing some. Information that these prisoners gave helped in blocking the Dead Sea path. Sayeret Haruv conducted helicopter raids of the east side (the Jordanian side) of the Dead Sea. In March 1970, in an encounter with a mobile terrorist squad that was unprepared for chopper machine gun fire, Haruv killed 3 terrorists and several more were captured. The Fatah Dead Sea routes were blocked.

### **---Sayeret Haruv in the Yom Kippur War of 1973.**

Sayeret Haruv was ordered to reach the Suez Canal and join General Bern's Division (of the Southern Command), which then began the crossing via bridges that were constructed by General Sharon's division. Here began the participation of Sayeret Haruv in one of most



difficult and grueling events in IDF history: General Bren's astounding but upsetting and dubious way of capturing the city of Suez. Before Haruv reached the city of Suez, it passed the canal and 'purified' the southern target, the area located to the west adjacent to the Canal. During its progress, Haruv encountered superior Egyptian commando forces and eliminated them. It then along with other forces, began to encircle the *Third Army* of the Egyptian army --which crossed the canal to the east at the beginning of the war. On its way a canon shell, which was shot east of the channel, hit one of armored personnel of Sayeret Haruv carrier and killed 12 fighters. As the unit reached the outskirts of the city of Suez, they learned that armored and paratrooper forces became trapped there, and this required a complicated operation to rescue them. Sayeret Haruv was entrusted with the task to handle the rescue operation, all with minimal intelligence, aerial photographs, and precise information regarding the location and condition of the trapped units. With all this information missing, Sayeret Haruv burst into the city and tried to reach and rescue those trapped. On the way, they encountered Egyptian forces which outnumbered them and ambushed the Sayeret in the city streets, firing bombs from higher floors and roofs. Many of the unit's soldiers were injured or killed, and now the unit was focused on rescuing itself. But Haruv still moved forward, cutting their way across the town from side to side and releasing a number of trapped IDF forces along the way. However, its mission was not completed and there were still paratroopers trapped, with many killed and many injured in a besieged city under Egyptian fire. Patrol Commander Lt. Col. Ivan, organized a group of armored personnel carriers (APC) and rushed back into the 'hell'. Now knowing the location of trapped personnel he was able to reach these units with full force. The victims were loaded on board the APCs and extracted from 'hell' at top speed. This daring operation is worthy of all praise.

The contribution of Sayeret Haruv to the blockading and sieging of the *Third Army*, and to the fact that it overcame the bloody the entanglement in Suez City is clear and definite; but, after 40 studying and unfolding the shock of mixed events of this 'uncalled war' of 1973, Sayeret Haruv still needs the recognition and acknowledgement it is deserving of. So it feels!

**End --1984**

After the Yom Kippur War, the IDF reorganized and on April 8, 1974, Haruv battalion was dispersed and its soldiers were transferred to other units in the IDF.

## **Memorial**

In 1990, we met with some friends and decided to form an association whose main task was to memorialize the Fighters of *Sayeret Haruv*.

In November of 1992, we inaugurated in the Jordan Valley -- with the assistance of the Regional Council-- the memorial room for the 71 fallen fighters of the Sayeret who gave their life for the state of Israel, some were on regular or permanent service, and some is reserve duty in other IDF units.

Every year in March a Memorial Ceremony is held in the Jordan Valley to commemorate the deceased; this event is conducted with the bereaved families and the Sayeret fighters.

Hall of the 17 the fighters of the "Haruv Today immortalized in the memorial Battalion" which was established in 1995 as part of "Kfir" Brigade that is stationed at Central Command.

## **(עמותה) Establishment of a new Association**

In 2012, in response to pressure and demand of many friends, new association was established a with a new team. The Association chairman is Brigadier General (res.) Yossi Koller who was commanded the *Sayeret Haruv* in years 1969-1970.

## **The new organization's goals are:**

1. Fostering and maintaining military heritage and pride among the "graduates" of *Sayeret Haruv*, their families and others.
2. Continue to commemorate the deceased of *Sayeret Haruv*.



3. Offer support to the association members and their families and the bereaved families.
4. Organize meetings and conferences, sporting competitions and cultural events, and other activities, which will contribute to the net-working among members of the *Sayeret* (also, setting up a website, publish a book about *Sayeret Haruv*, and more.)
5. Maintain a contact with various IDF units.
6. Management and participation in various events in order to raise funds. (Included are collection, billing and receiving payments and donations). All will be used to fulfill association goals.
7. Ensuring the financial value of the organization as the management deems fit (in a solid and conservative manner).
8. The Association will represent its members before agencies, institution, corporations and other, on behalf of the organization's goals only.
9. The association's assets and revenues will be used only for the purposes specified in this section, and the distribution of profits or benefits in any form among its members is prohibited.

### **Work Plan for 2013**

- A. A work- meeting once a month (Association management and sub – Committees heads).
- B. Participation in company events.
- C. Meeting with Bereaved families + the entire *Haruv* in Ramat Gan – as planned.
- D. Book Publishing the History of *Haruv*- in preparation.
- E. Continued development and maintenance of a website.
- F. Memorial ceremony of the decencies in the Jordan Valley - March 2013 – Done.
- G. Laying flower wreaths of on Remembrance Day - April 15, 2013 all fallen fighters of *Sayeret Haruv* - Done.
- H. Lectures about battle heritage of “*Haruv*” and the Jordan Valley. – In progress.
- I. Meeting members of the Association regarding the annual report at the end of 2013.
- J. Submission to the Financial Report to Registrar of Associations
- K. Contact with bereaved families – on going.
- L. Continue updating squads, classes (rounds) and contacts – on going .
- M. Publishing data “*Haruv*” at IDF archives - on going.

- N. Summarizing the subject of "belonging" (*paratroops* or to *Kfir*).
- O. Visitation in the memorial Room – on going.
- P. New Year's gift to bereaved families the book of Haggai Lotan: "Sea of Death " – Done
- Q. 'Solidification' (get together) the Association committee and heads of Sub-committees – Planned.
- R. Call to Members to join various committees. –Planned.
- S. Square naming ceremony in Ramat Gan, to named after *Sayeret Haruv* "– Done.
- T. Upgrade the memorial Room - done Parts ( Phase I )

